362 NLRB 593
Landry's, Inc. and its Wholly Owned Subsidiary Bubba Gump Shrimp Co. Restaurants, Inc.
LANDRY’S INC.
593
Landry’s Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary Bubba
Gump Shrimp Co. Restaurants, Inc. and Sophia
Flores. Case 32–CA–118213
April 16, 2015
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS MISCIMARRA, HIROZAWA,
AND JOHNSON
On June 26, 2014, Administrative Law Judge Gerald
A. Wacknov issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the Re-
spondent filed an answering brief, and the General Coun-
sel filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions1 and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions3
and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted and the complaint is dismissed.
1 No exceptions were filed to the judge’s finding that, in light of his
decision to dismiss the complaint on other grounds, it was unnecessary
to address whether the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining
language in its social media policy prohibiting employees from using
“any words, logos, or other marks” that would infringe upon the intel-
lectual property rights of the Respondent.
2 The General Counsel has excepted to some of the judge’s credibil-
ity findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an ad-
ministrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
3 We agree with the judge’s dismissal of the complaint, which alleg-
es that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining
an unlawful social media policy in the May 2012 edition of the em-
ployee handbook. In so doing, we rely only on the judge’s findings that
the charge in this case was filed at a time when the May 2012 hand-
book, which was specifically identified in the complaint as the basis for
the alleged violation, without any more general allegation, had already
been superseded by the October 2013 handbook and, further, that the
October 2013 version was neither alleged nor found to be unlawful.
We do not rely on the judge’s misstatement that the social media policy
in the May 2012 handbook had not been enforced; we find, however,
that there is no evidence that the social media policy had been enforced
in response to Sec. 7 activity. We also do not rely on the judge’s com-
ment that, were the Board to order a remedy here, such a remedy
“could be characterized as punitive rather than remedial.”
Shelley Brenner, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Ryan McCortney, Esq. (Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton
LLP), of Costa Mesa, California, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GERALD A. WACKNOV, Administrative Law Judge. Pursuant
to notice, a hearing in this matter was held before me in San
Francisco, California, on April 22, 2014. The captioned charge
was filed on December 2, 2013, by Sophia Flores, an individu-
al. On January 30, 2014, the Regional Director for Region 20
of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued a
complaint and notice of hearing alleging violations by Landry’s
Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary Bubba Gump Shrimp Co.
Restaurants, Inc. (herein jointly referred to as Respondent) of
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amend-
ed (the Act). An amended complaint was issued on April 1,
2014. The Respondent, in its answers to the complaint and
amended complaint, duly filed, denies that it has violated the
Act as alleged.
The parties were afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to
call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
relevant evidence. Since the close of the hearing, briefs have
been received from counsel for the General Counsel (the Gen-
eral Counsel) and counsel for the Respondent. Upon the entire
record, and based upon my observation of the witnesses and
consideration of the briefs submitted, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Landry’s Inc. is a corporation with an office and place of
business in Houston, Texas, where it is engaged in the nation-
wide operation of restaurants, hospitality venues, casinos, and
entertainment establishments through subsidiary enterprises,
including Bubba Gump Shrimp Co. Restaurants, Inc. In the
course and conduct of its business operations, Landry’s Inc.
derives gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchases and
receives at its Houston, Texas offices goods and services val-
ued in excess of $5000 which originated directly from points
outside the State of Texas. It is admitted and I find that Re-
spondent Landry’s Inc. is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
Bubba Gump Shrimp Co. Restaurants, Inc. is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Landry’s Inc., and has operated restaurants
in various States, including a restaurant in Monterey, Califor-
nia. In the course and conduct of its business operations Bubba
Gump Shrimp Co. Restaurants, Inc. derives gross revenues in
excess of $500,000 and purchases and receives at its Monterey,
California restaurant goods and services valued in excess of
$5000 which originated directly from points outside the State of
California. It is admitted and I find that Respondent Bubba
Gump Shrimp Co. Restaurants, Inc. is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
362 NLRB No. 69
594
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Issues
The principal issues in this proceeding are whether the Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining
an unlawful social media policy in its May 2012 employee
handbook, and, assuming arguendo that certain handbook pro-
visions violate the act, whether it would effectuate the purposes
of the Act to find a violation under the circumstances herein.
B. Facts and Analysis
Landry’s Inc. is the ultimate parent corporation of numerous
distinct subsidiary corporate entities which together employ
approximately 50,000 employees at more than 500 restaurant
locations, and other locations, nationwide. Bubba Gump
Shrimp Co. Restaurants, Inc. is one of the aforementioned cor-
porate entities.
Insofar as the record shows, all 50,000 employees at Land-
ry’s subsidiary locations are subject to the terms and conditions
of the current edition of Landry’s employee handbook which is
in effect nationwide.
Upon investigation of the charge filed by Sophia Flores, the
Charging Party, the Regional Office determined that Flores was
not terminated1 in violation of the Act as she was not engaged
in concerted protected activity in making certain negative
statements on a social website regarding her employment.2
However, the Region determined that the Respondent’s social
media policy contained in its then-current handbook at the time
Flores was terminated, was unlawful and issued the instant
complaint on that issue alone.
Flores was a server at a Bubba Gump restaurant in Monterey,
California. When she was hired in May 2011, she was given a
then-current Landry’s employee handbook. Flores testified that
upon being hired she participated in an orientation during
which “We spent a good part of a full day going over each sec-
tion and subsection of the handbook and reading it thoroughly.”
She was required to sign an employee handbook acknowl-
edgement form, stating, inter alia, as follows:
Since the information, policies and benefits described here are
necessarily subject to change, I acknowledge that revisions to
the Employee Handbook may occur, except to Landry’s poli-
cy of employment at will. All such changes will be commu-
nicated through official notices, and I understand that revised
1 The Respondent maintains that Flores was not terminated but was
simply relieved of her 2-week notice requirement after tendering her
resignation. Thus, Flores had tendered her resignation and, with about
5 days remaining to fulfill her 2-week notice requirement, posted mate-
rial on a website which came to the attention of management.
2 Flores testified that upon inquiring how her posting came to the at-
tention of management she was told by a manager that the Respondent
had someone who checked employees’ social media sites for such
materials. While I credit Flores, I discount the statement of the manag-
er as simply an attempt to prevent a confrontation between Flores and
other employees who, according to a position statement from the Re-
spondent during the investigation of this matter (which was not re-
ceived in evidence for the truth of the matters contained therein), may
have brought the matter to the Respondent’s attention. It seems rather
unlikely that the Respondent would employ social media monitors to
monitor the postings of 50,000 employees.
information may supersede, modify, or eliminate existing pol-
icies.
Flores testified that at a “five-minute meeting”3 approximately
a year after her initial employment—that is, in about May
2012—she and other assembled employees were told by the
supervisor conducting the meeting that there was a revision to
the handbook; and further, apparently at the same meeting, the
assistant general manager advised the employees that if any
employee needed to see the revised handbook there was one
available. Flores did not obtain a copy.
The Respondent’s 2012 social media policy that was in ef-
fect at the time of Flores’ termination is no longer in effect and,
insofar as the record shows was superseded, prior to Flores’
filing of her instant December 2, 2013 charge, by a more re-
cent, and substantially different social media policy contained
in a new October 2013 edition of the employee handbook.4
Insofar as the record shows, all new employees are given a
copy of the employee handbook that is current at the time they
are hired, and are required to sign the identical aforementioned
employee handbook acknowledgement form that Flores signed.
All other employees are told that the handbook has been re-
vised and that a current edition is available for their inspection
and use at each restaurant location; it is unclear whether these
employees are also offered a copy of the new handbook in the
event they want to retain a personal copy.
The complaint herein involves only the social media policy
contained in the 2012 edition of the Respondent’s employee
handbook. The 2012 handbook provides as follows:
Anyone found to be in violation of any Company policy or
provision may be subject to disciplinary action, up to and in-
cluding termination of employment.
The 2012 social media policy is as follows:
Social media includes all forms of public, web-based com-
munications and expression that brings people together by
making it easier to publish content to many individuals. The
Social Media Policy applies if you are authorized to represent
the Company on social media platforms or if you choose to
make references to the Company, its affiliates or officers
when you are using social media in a personal capacity. In
order to post on external social media sites for work purposes,
3 It appears that “customary” 5-minute meetings were held either at
the beginning of every shift or perhaps less frequently to update em-
ployees on items of interest and other matters pertaining to their work
responsibilities.
4 The existence of an updated social media policy was referenced in
the Respondent’s communications to the Regional Office during the
investigation of this matter, and was furnished in a highly redacted
format. The October 2013 edition of the employee handbook was intro-
duced into evidence by the General Counsel but was not physically
furnished to the General Counsel until the end of the hearing. Accord-
ingly, I advised the General Counsel that if there was something in the
October 2013 handbook that “you think needs to be litigated or talked
about, we can reconvene the hearing.” There has been no motion to
reconvene the hearing or to amend the complaint to allege that the
October 2013 handbook contains an unlawful social media policy or
any other unlawful provisions.
LANDRY’S INC.
595
you will need prior approval from the Vice President of Mar-
keting and acknowledge receipt of the Company’s Standards
for Social Media Representatives.
While your free time is generally not subject to any restriction
by the Company, the Company urges all employees not to
post information regarding the Company, their jobs, or other
employees which could lead to morale issues in the workplace
or detrimentally affect the Company’s business. This can be
accomplished by always thinking before you post, being civil
to others and their opinions, and not posting personal infor-
mation about others unless you have received their permis-
sion. You are personally responsible for the content you pub-
lish on blogs, wikis, or any other form of social media. Be
mindful that what you publish will be public for a long time.
Be also mindful that if the Company receives a complaint
from an employee about information you have posted about
that employee, the Company may need to investigate that
complaint to insure that there has been no violation of the har-
assment policy or other Company policy. In the event there is
such a complaint, you will be expected to cooperate in any in-
vestigation of that complaint, including providing access to
the posts at issue.
If you identify yourself as a Landry’s employee or discuss
matters related to the Company’s business on social media,
please remember that although you may view your site as a
blog or a personal project and medium of personal expression,
some readers may nonetheless view you as a de facto spokes-
person for the Company. You must make it clear that the
views you express are yours alone and that they do not neces-
sarily reflect the views of the Company. To help reduce the
potential for confusion, please put a disclaimer in a prominent
location on your page. For example, “The view expressed on
this web site/blog are mine alone and do not necessarily re-
flect the views of my employer.”
Without prior written approval from the Vice President of
Marketing, no employee shall use any words, logos, or other
marks that would infringe upon the trademark, service mark,
certification mark, or other intellectual property rights of the
Company or its business partners. All rules that apply to em-
ployee activities, including the protection of proprietary and
confidential information, apply to all blogs and online activi-
ty.
The General Counsel’s brief points out that
In this case, Respondent’ Landry’s Social Media Policy does
not explicitly prohibit Section 7 activity. There is no evidence
that it was promulgated in response to union or protected con-
certed activity. Nor has the rule been found to restrict the ex-
ercise of Section 7 rights. Thus, the only relevant inquiry in
this case is whether employees would reasonably construe the
Social Media Policy to prohibit activity protected by the Act.
The General Counsel maintains that employees would reasona-
bly construe the following language to prohibit activity protect-
ed by the Act:
While your free time is generally not subject to any restriction
by the Company, the Company urges all employees not to
post information regarding the Company, their jobs, or other
employees which could lead to morale issues in the workplace
or detrimentally affect the Company’s business. This can be
accomplished by always thinking before you post, being civil
to others and their opinions, and not posting personal infor-
mation about others unless you have received their permis-
sion.
I do not agree. The first sentence does not explicitly prohibit
employees from posting their own job-related information or
information regarding the jobs of coworkers, or personal infor-
mation regarding coworkers, or information regarding the
Company. Rather, it urges employees not to do so if such in-
formation is likely to create morale problems. Without more, it
would be reasonable for employees reading this language to
conclude that the Respondent generally frowns upon all job-
related postings of any type. However, the cautionary language
is modified by the language in the next sentences which may be
understood to clarify that the avoidance of morale problems
may be “accomplished” by simply being civil to others and
their opinions. In other words, it is not the job-related subject
matter of the postings that are of concern to the Respondent,
but rather the manner in which the subject matter is articulated
and debated among the employees.
The foregoing two sentences were obviously crafted to be
read together and not in isolation, and a fair effort must be
made to give each its intended meaning.5 Forethought and
civility in the exercise of protected concerted or union activity
are not mutually exclusive concepts.6 Accordingly, employees
reading the Respondent’s social media policy could reasonably
conclude, I find, that they are being urged to be civil with oth-
ers in posting job-related material and discussing on social
media sites their grievances and disagreements with the Re-
spondent or each other regarding job-related matters. Nor do I
find that the admonition regarding “posting personal infor-
mation about others” would reasonably inhibit employees from
posting information regarding coworkers’ wages, as the Gen-
eral Counsel contends. There is no restriction in the social
media policy against posting “personnel” information or “pay-
roll information,” or “wage-related information”; and obvious-
ly, posting information that in common parlance is generally
understood to be personal such as, for example, matters regard-
ing social relationships and similar private matters, could result
not only in morale problems but could also constitute “harass-
ment” to which the Respondent’s social media policy refers. It
is readily apparent that such postings would likely create enmi-
ty among employees in the workplace which could, in turn,
adversely affect the Respondent’s business.7
5 By ignoring this language in the second sentence, the General
Counsel, in her brief, seems to be assuming that it is simply irrelevant
and of no consequence.
6 See Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 NLRB 1100 (2012): “We also
adopt, for the reasons stated in his decision, the judge’s dismissal of the
complaint allegation that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by
maintaining a rule requiring employees to use ‘appropriate business
decorum’ in communicating with others.”
7 The brief of the General Counsel references the last sentence of the
social media policy which incorporates into the social media policy
“the protection of proprietary and confidential information.” The Gen-
596
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In Palms Hotel & Casino, 344 NLRB 1363, 1367 (2005), the
Board quotes from Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343
NLRB 646 (2004), as follows:
[A]n employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a
work rule that reasonably tends to chill employees in the ex-
ercise of their Section 7 rights. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326
NLRB 824, 825 (1998). In determining whether a challenged
rule is unlawful, the Board must, however, give the rule a rea-
sonable reading. It must refrain from reading particular
phrases in isolation, and it must not presume improper inter-
ference with employee rights. Id. at 825, 827.
And the Board goes on to state, at 1368, that it is unwilling to
“condemn as unlawful a facially neutral workrule that is not
aimed at Section 7 activity and was neither adopted in response
to such activity nor enforced against it.” Cf. Labinal, Inc., 340
NLRB 203 (2003) (rule that employees should not find out
about another employee’s personal pay information and dis-
close it to others).
Regarding the final paragraph of the social media policy, the
General Counsel, citing Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 301 NLRB
1008, 1019–1020 (1991), maintains that the language prohibit-
ing any words, logos, or other marks of the Respondent without
preauthorization is unlawful as the preauthorization require-
ment may lead an employee to refrain from using such words,
logos, or other marks while engaged in Section 7 activity. The
General Counsel further maintains that an employee without
legal training would not be expected to understand the implica-
tions of the language and cannot be expected to have the exper-
tise to examine company rules from a legal standpoint; and
therefore, the Respondent’s failure to use lay terms in its social
media policy to make clear that employees’ “non-commercial”
use of words, logos, or other marks is not infringement, and is
permissible without preauthorization, leaves the policy ambig-
uously overbroad as to its scope.
The Respondent correctly distinguishes the General Coun-
sel’s analogy of the Pepsi-Cola case to the facts in the instant
case, and maintains that the Board’s decision in Flamingo Hil-
ton-Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287 (1999), is more closely applica-
ble to the facts herein. Thus, in Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, the
rule prohibiting the wearing of hotel uniforms off hotel premis-
es was found to be lawful when the rule was not promulgated in
response to union activity and not restricted only to union activ-
ities.
eral Counsel maintains that this language invokes another section of the
handbook headed “Non-Disclosure.” The General Counsel further
maintains that the Non-Disclosure policy contains language that could
be construed to prohibit an employee from posting a coworker’s wages.
I find no merit to the General Counsel’s argument. The Non-
Disclosure policy is a distinct section of the handbook. It was not
alleged in the complaint as being unlawful, it was not referred to during
the hearing, and its meaning or interpretation and applicability was not
litigated.
The Respondent also cites the analysis in the following Gen-
eral Counsel’s advice memorandum in Cox Communications,
Inc., October 19, 2012:
We further find lawful the provision directing employees to
“respect the laws regarding copyrights, trademarks, rights of
publicity and other third-party rights”; and to “not infringe on
Cox logos, brand names, taglines, slogans, or other trade-
marks.” The Employer has a proprietary interest in its trade-
marks, including its logo if trademarked. Unlike other cases
where employers maintained rules that unlawfully prohibited
employees from using copyrighted material in their online
communications, this rule does not prohibit the use, but mere-
ly urges employees to respect the laws. Thus, the provision in
context would not reasonably be understood to pertain to or
restrict Section 7 activity. (Citation omitted.)
A critical reading of the “Infringement” paragraph would
cause a conscientious employee to carefully evaluate its ap-
plicability to union-related or concerted activity-related media
postings. As infringement is not defined, the employee is
placed in the position of having to exercise his or her best
judgment in determining whether postings that include particu-
lar “words, logos, or other marks” may run afoul of the provi-
sion. The provision is similar to the language analyzed in the
foregoing General Counsel’s advice memo, and the parties have
cited no Board law on the subject. I conclude that as the com-
plaint should be dismissed on other grounds, this matter need
not be determined in this proceeding.
As noted, the May 2012 edition of the employee handbook is
no longer in effect, and no portion of the current October 2013
edition of the employee handbook has been alleged as violative
of the Act herein.8 Moreover, I have found that the October
2013 edition of the handbook was issued, distributed and/or
announced, and made available to employees, prior to the filing
of the instant charge. Further, there is no evidence that any of
the social media provisions of the May 2012 edition of the
handbook have been enforced against any employee. On the
basis of the foregoing, and assuming arguendo that any of the
provisions of the expired May 2012 edition of the employee
handbook violate the Act, I find that it would not effectuate the
purposes of the Act to find a violation herein, and impose a
remedy that under the circumstances could be characterized as
punitive rather than remedial.
Accordingly, I shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
8 While the foregoing “infringement” paragraph in the May 2012
edition of the employee handbook is identical to the corresponding
paragraph in the October 2013 edition of the employee handbook,
nevertheless other language in the social media policy contained in the
updated edition may have a bearing on the interpretation of that provi-
sion.
LANDRY’S INC.
597
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent has not violated the Act as alleged in the
complaint.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, I issue the
following recommended
ORDER9
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
9 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.