Starbucks Corporation

373 NLRB No. 105 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex- ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes. Starbucks Corporation and Workers United Labor Un- ion International, affiliated with Service Employ- ees International Union. Case 19–CA–301179 September 19, 2024 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCFERRAN AND MEMBERS PROUTY AND WILCOX On December 20, 2023, Administrative Law Judge Dickie Montemayor issued the attached decision.1 The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel and the Charging Party each filed an- swering briefs,2 and the Respondent filed a reply brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.3 The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,4 findings,5 and conclusions, and to 1 The transcript indicates that the correct pronouns were not consist- ently used when referring to Natalie Mattera during the hearing. As the Board explained in Home Depot USA, Inc., 373 NLRB No. 25, slip op. at 1 fn. 5 (2024), “[a]s a matter of federal and agency policy, the personal pronouns that individuals indicate they use should be used in decisions issued by the Board, its administrative law judges and regional directors, and in all other agency communications.” We note that the judge’s de- cision used the correct pronouns to refer to Mattera, and we do the same in this decision. 2 The General Counsel has requested that the Board take administra- tive notice of the judge’s decision in Starbucks Corp., Case 19–CA– 293492 (Sept. 21, 2023), which involves alleged unfair labor practices at the same store. We decline to do so given that a judge’s decision pending before the Board is not binding authority. See St. Vincent Medical Cen- ter, 338 NLRB 888, 888 (2003), remanded on other grounds 463 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2006). 3 The Respondent asserts that Members Prouty and Wilcox should recuse themselves based on their “past, present, and perceived relation- ships with the Service Employees International Union.” Members Prouty and Wilcox have determined, in consultation with the Board’s Designated Agency Ethics Official, that there is no basis to recuse them- selves from the adjudication of this case. 4 On exception, the Respondent argues that Mattera’s testimony re- garding District Manager Taylor Pringle’s instructions to Store Manager Kailee Hubbard regarding the storewide union materials ban, as relayed to Mattera by Hubbard, is inadmissible “double hearsay.” The Respond- ent’s argument is without merit. A party admission is not hearsay. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) and 805. See Kamtech, Inc., 333 NLRB 242, 242 fn. 4 (2001) (purported “double hearsay” statements were actually party admissions not barred by the hearsay rule), enfd. 314 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2002). Notably, on the date of the hearing, the Respondent still em- ployed Pringle. “[W]hen a party fails to call a witness who may reason- ably be assumed to be favorably disposed to the party, an adverse infer- ence may be drawn regarding any factual question on which the witness is likely to have knowledge.” International Automated Machines, 285 NLRB 1122, 1123 (1987), enfd. 861 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1988). Since the adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth in full below.6 The Union was certified as employees’ exclusive bar- gaining representative in June 2022. In late July, em- ployee Natalie Mattera placed a sandwich bag of union buttons and business cards on a counter in employees’ de facto break area so that their coworkers could take an item. Around August 9, Mattera noticed that the bag was miss- ing. Mattera asked Store Manager Kailee Hubbard if she had any idea where the bag was. Hubbard told Mattera that District Manager Taylor Pringle instructed Hubbard “to throw away the baggie of pins in the cards because [Pringle] informed [Hubbard] that we were not allowed to have union materials in the store.” Hubbard also told Mat- tera that Pringle said, “they could be distributed outside of the store, like in the parking lot for somebody trying.” The complaint alleged, and the judge found, that the Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by communi- cating to employees that they could not have materials supporting the Union at the Eastlake store; by communi- cating to employees that they could not distribute materi- als supporting the Union at the Eastlake store, including in Respondent chose not to call Pringle as a witness, we find it appropriate to draw an adverse inference against the Respondent. See United Parcel Service, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 158, slip op. at 16 fn. 68 (2023). 5 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis- trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Stand- ard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. 6 We have amended the judge’s Conclusions of Law consistent with our findings herein. We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to require the Respondent to rescind its workplace rule prohibiting em- ployees from possessing and distributing union materials, to conform to our findings herein and to the Board’s standard remedial language, and in accordance with Paragon Systems, Inc., 371 NLRB No. 104 (2022). We shall substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified. The General Counsel requests that the Board grant several extraordi- nary remedies. We deny this request because the Board’s traditional remedies are sufficient to effectuate the policies of the Act in this matter. Member Prouty would order the notice-reading remedy requested by the General Counsel. See CP Anchorage Hotel 2 d/b/a Hilton Anchor- age, 371 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 9–15 (2022) (Member Prouty, con- curring) (urging the Board to adopt a reading of the notice aloud and distribution to employees at a group meeting as a standard remedy for unfair labor practices because “[h]aving the notice to employees read aloud to them in a group meeting, with a copy in hand to follow along if they choose, is a superior means of disseminating and amplifying the Board’s message to maximize the extent to which employees hear and comprehend it.”), enfd. 98 F.4th 314 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Member Prouty joins his colleagues in denying the requested supervisory-training rem- edy, but notes that he would be open to considering, in a future appropri- ate case, whether it would effectuate the policies of the Act to order that employees receive training from a Board agent, during working time, regarding their rights under the Act. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2 nonwork areas; and by throwing away its employees’ un- ion pins and materials at the Eastlake store. The judge, in analyzing the allegations, indicated that the counter where Mattera placed the bag of union materials was a “mixed use” area, and that, absent certain exceptions, employers may not prohibit the distribution of union literature in such areas. The judge then found that Pringle’s instruction, which Hubbard relayed to Mattera, was presumptively in- valid and unlawful because it completely prohibited em- ployees from having union materials on the store premises at any time. He further found that the Respondent unlaw- fully removed the union materials from the counter “be- cause of” the unlawful prohibition/directive. In affirming the judge’s finding that the Respondent vi- olated Section 8(a)(1), we do not rely on the judge’s dis- cussion of mixed-use areas. Whether the counter was a mixed-use area is not dispositive in these circumstances, given the storewide prohibition on employees’ possessing and distributing union materials. We find that what the judge referred to as the Respondent’s directive/prohibition on employees’ possessing and distributing union materials storewide was, in fact, an unlawful orally promulgated no- possession/no-distribution rule that Pringle issued and Hubbard relayed to Mattera.7 The rule is presumptively invalid, as it prohibits, on its face, employees from having or distributing union materials anywhere in the store— with no exceptions for particular areas of the store or times. See Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615, 621 (1962) (presumptively unlawful to restrict distribution of literature in nonworking areas during nonworking time). Nor has the Respondent pointed to any special circum- stances that would justify this blanket rule. It has therefore failed to rebut the presumption that the rule is invalid. 7 The complaint alleges that the Respondent, by Hubbard, on or about August 9, “communicated to its employees that they could not distribute materials supporting the Union at the Eastlake store, including in non- work areas,” “communicated to its employees that they could not have materials supporting the Union at the Eastlake store,” and, in or around the first week of August, “threw away its employees’ Union pins and materials.” While the complaint does not allege that those actions con- stituted the oral promulgation of a rule or the disposal of union materials based on that rule, “[i]t is well settled that the Board may find and remedy a violation even in the absence of a specified allegation in the complaint if the issue is closely connected to the subject matter of the complaint and has been fully litigated.” Pergament United Sales, 296 NLRB 333, 334 (1989), enfd. 920 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1990). We find that both prongs of Pergament are satisfied here. First, the issue of whether the Respondent orally promulgated a rule and discarded union materials pursuant to that rule is closely connected to the subject matter of the complaint. Thus, regardless of whether Hub- bard’s statement is characterized as a communication or an orally prom- ulgated rule, the violation found turns on the same facts and considera- tions. Second, the question of whether the Respondent promulgated an unlawful rule and discarded union materials pursuant to that rule has been fully litigated. The “determination of whether a matter has been fully litigated rests in part on whether the absence of a specific allegation Further, we find no merit in the Respondent’s suggestion that statements made to a single employee cannot be con- strued as setting forth a general directive. See, e.g., Star- bucks Corp., 372 NLRB No. 93, slip op. at 1 fn. 4 (2023) (finding a violation based on a one-on-one conversation during which a supervisor orally conveyed an overbroad distribution ban), enfd. per curiam 2024 WL 1319142 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2024). See also Saia Motor Freight Line, 333 NLRB 784, 785 (2001) (same); Programming & Systems, 275 NLRB 1147, 1147 fn. 2 (1985) (same). Nothing in Hubbard’s statement to Mattera suggests that it was limited to this particular incident. And Hubbard’s statement to Mattera was not a casual, off-the-cuff remark. To the contrary, Hubbard’s statement emphasized that the prohibition she was relaying to Mattera was issued by Pringle, a manager with authority over multiple stores. Further, based on Mattera’s unrebutted testimony, the sig- nificance of the rule was hammered home to Mattera by Hubbard, who repeated it after Mattera sought clarifica- tion of its scope.8 Having determined that the Respondent orally promul- gated this unlawful rule, we further find that the Respond- ent unlawfully discarded the union materials pursuant to the rule. Indeed, there is no question about the Respond- ent’s reason for discarding the union materials: Hubbard specifically told Mattera that Pringle instructed her to throw away the bag of pins and cards because of the store- wide prohibition on possessing/distributing union materi- als. See Sprint/United Management Co., 326 NLRB 397, 399 (1998) (finding that the respondent unlawfully dis- carded union materials because it was done pursuant to an precluded a respondent from presenting exculpatory evidence or whether the respondent would have altered the conduct of its case at the hearing, had a specific allegation been made.” Pergament, supra at 335. Here, the record reflects that the parties fully litigated the questions of whether the Respondent, through Hubbard, communicated a prohibition on em- ployees’ possessing and distribution union materials, and threw away un- ion materials based on the prohibition. Mattera was examined about Hub- bard’s communication and the Respondent had the opportunity to present testimonial and documentary evidence regarding the communication. We further note that although the judge did not explicitly refer to the communication as a “rule,” his statements characterizing the communi- cation as an unlawful prohibition/directive were virtually indistinguish- able from viewing the prohibition as an orally promulgated rule. The Respondent has focused its arguments on whether Hubbard made the al- legedly unlawful statement, whether the statement can be construed as a prohibition/directive because it was issued to one employee, and whether it was privileged to throw away the union materials. In short, regardless of how the communication is characterized, the facts and considerations relate to both questions, and have been fully litigated. 8 We note that in Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113, slip op. at 3 (2023), the Board stated that its decision did not disturb the Board’s long- established doctrine covering work rules that address certain matters in- cluding, as is applicable here, union distribution. STARBUCKS CORP. 3 unlawful no-distribution rule).9 We also observe that the Respondent’s disparate treatment of union and nonunion materials left on the counter underscores that the Respond- ent acted unlawfully by removing the union materials. Thus, Mattera’s unrebutted testimony establishes that em- ployees left their drinks on the counter where Mattera had placed the bag of union materials. However, the record does not show that the Respondent would remove the drinks from the counter.10 In sum, we find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by orally promulgating a workplace rule prohibit- ing employees from possessing or distributing union ma- terials storewide, and by unlawfully enforcing this rule by discarding the bag of union materials that Mattera had placed on the counter. AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 3. “3. The Respondent committed unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by: (a) promulgating and enforcing a workplace rule pro- hibiting employees from possessing and distributing union materials; and (b) discarding union materials pursuant to an unlaw- fully promulgated workplace rule.” ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Re- spondent, Starbucks Corporation, Seattle, Washington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Promulgating or enforcing a workplace rule prohib- iting employees from possessing and distributing union materials. (b) Discarding union materials pursuant to an unlaw- fully promulgated workplace rule. 9 Further, having adopted the judge’s finding that the Respondent vi- olated Sec. 8(a)(1) by discarding the bag of union materials, we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s additional finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by discarding the union flyers from the back room, because the finding of an additional violation in this regard would not materially affect the remedy. 10 The judge correctly rejected the Respondent’s argument (which it renews in its exceptions) that it removed the union materials as a “house- keeping” function or for other neutral reasons. As the judge observed, the Respondent’s argument is unpersuasive because it’s clearly articu- lated reason for the removal was the complete prohibition on having un- ion materials in the store and distributing such materials anywhere other than the parking lot. We find the Respondent’s remaining challenges to be unpersuasive. 11 If the facility involved in this proceeding is open and staffed by a substantial complement of employees, the notice must be posted within 14 days after service by the Region. If the facility involved in this (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Rescind its workplace rule prohibiting employees from possessing and distributing union materials. (b) Post at its Seattle, Washington Eastlake store, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 19, after being signed by the Respondent’s author- ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are cus- tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the store involved in these proceedings, the Re- spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former em- ployees employed by the Respondent at any time since August 11, 2022. (c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for Region 19 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to com- ply. Dated, Washington, D.C. September 19, 2024 ______________________________________ Lauren McFerran, Chairman proceeding is closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of em- ployees due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19) pandemic, the notice must be posted within 14 days after the facility reopens and a substantial complement of employees have returned to work. If, while closed or not staffed by a substantial complement of employees due to the pandemic, the Respondent is communicating with its employees by electronic means, the notice must also be posted by such electronic means withing 14 days after service by the Region. If the notice to be physically posted was posted electronically more than 60 days before physical posting of the notice, the notice shall state at the bottom that “This notice is the same notice previously [sent or posted] electronically on [date].” If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4 ______________________________________ David M. Prouty, Member ______________________________________ Gwynne A. Wilcox, Member (SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio- lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your bene- fit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac- tivities. WE WILL NOT promulgate or enforce a workplace rule prohibiting you from possessing and distributing union materials. WE WILL NOTdiscard union materials pursuant to an un- lawfully promulgated workplace rule. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above. WE WILL rescind our workplace rule prohibiting you from possessing and distributing union materials. STARBUCKS CORPORATION The Board’s decision can be found at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/19-CA-301179 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940. Ann Marie Skov, Esq., for the General Counsel. Ryan P. Hammond, Esq., Renea I. Saade, Esq., Alyson D. Dieckman, Esq., Noah G. Lipschultz, Esq., Michael R. Lovejoy, Esq. (Littler Mendelson, PC), for the Respondent. Gabe Frumkin, Esq. (Barnard Iglitzin & Lavitt LLP), for the Charging Party. STATEMENT OF THE CASE DICKIE MONTEMAYOR, Administrative Law Judge. A hearing was held in this matter in Seattle, Washington, on July 18, 2023. Workers United Labor Union International, affiliated with Ser- vice Employees International Union (Union or Charging Party) filed the charge on August 11, 2022. The General Counsel, through the Regional Director for Region 19 of the National La- bor Relations Board (the Board), issued a complaint and notice of hearing on January 4, 2023. Starbucks Corporation (Respond- ent or Starbucks) filed a timely answer to the complaint. The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Sections 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by discard- ing its employees’ union pins and materials, communicating to employees that they could not distribute materials supporting the union at the Eastlake store, and communicating to employees that they could not have materials supporting the union at the Eastlake store. On the entire record, including my observation of the de- meanor of witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, Charging Party, and Respondent, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent, a Washington corporation with a facility located at 2344 Eastlake Avenue, Seattle, Washington (Eastlake Store), has been engaged in the retail sale of food and beverages. Re- spondent, in conducting its operations annually, derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000, and sold and shipped from the state of Washington goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Washington. Accordingly, I find, and Respondent admits, that it is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. I also find that the Charging Party has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Relevant Facts Kailee Hubbard was a store manager at the Eastlake store dur- ing the relevant time of the allegations of this case. Natalie STARBUCKS CORP. 5 Mattera was a barista who worked at the Eastlake store. On June 7, 2022, A Certification of Representative was issued by Region 19 certifying that the employees had selected the union as its ex- clusive collective bargaining representative. (Jt. Exh. 1 (a), 2.) After the certification in late July Mattera brought a sandwich bag containing union buttons and business cards to the Eastlake store. Mattera’s intention was to leave the bag so that employees could choose if they so desired to take a pin or card. Mattera left the bag in an area described as a partner area where the employ- ees regularly took their breaks. Because there was no area at the facility officially designated as a “break room” it was in fact the defacto break area that partners used given the lack of other break room alternatives. The partner area was an area that was behind the counter which customers did not ordinarily have ac- cess to as it was where the store iPad was located. (Tr. 38). On or about August 9, 2022, Mattera noticed that the baggie was no longer where it was left. Mattera then approached store manager Hubbard. Mattera testified regarding the conversation as follows: I came into work the next few days, and after a few days, I had noticed that the bag of buttons was no longer where I'd left it. And it was also not in the back room. I checked two drawers in the desk and everything. I asked partners if they had moved it or if everyone had taken one, so it was empty. No one had moved it. No one knew where it had gone. So at the end of my shift, Kailee, my store manager at the time, was seated in the lobby. So, I went up to her and asked if she had any idea where they went. At this time, she told me that she was instructed by her district manager, Taylor Pringle, to throw away the baggie of pins in the cards because he informed her that we were not allowed to have union materials in the store. She said that he said they could be distributed outside of the store, like, in the parking lot for somebody trying. (Tr. 25). The sandwich bag with pins weren’t the only union material that Mattera brought into the store. Mattera also brought in and posted three separate flyers in the back-office area. (Tr. 23–25 GC Exh. 4–6.) The flyers were all posted on the refrigerator which was used as a makeshift bulletin board. One flyer refer- enced Weingarten rights, another congratulated the employees on choosing union representation and described next steps, an- other informed employees about actions that an employer cannot take unilaterally without bargaining with the union. (GC Exh. 4–6). These flyers were removed and discarded which Mattera noticed sometime around August 9, 2022. Respondent admitted that it discarded the materials referenced in the complaint. (GC Exh. 1(g).) III. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. The 8(a)(1) Allegation Section 8(a)(1) provides that it is an unfair labor practice to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7. The Board has set forth an objective test to determine if the employer engaged in conduct 1 It is important to note that Pringle nor Hubbard testified at the pro- ceedings and Mattera’s testimony regarding what transpired is unrebut- ted in the record. It should also be noted that Pringle at the time of the which would reasonably have a tendency to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act. Santa Barbara News–Press, 358 NLRB 1539 (2012), Multi-Ad Services, 331 NLRB 1226, 1227–1228 (2000). The test “does not turn on the employer’s motive or on whether the coercion succeeded or failed.” American Tissue Corp., 336 NLRB 435, 441 (2001), cit- ing NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1946). Although not without limitations, the Board and the Supreme Court have long recognized the rights of employees to share un- ion literature. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570–572, 98 S.Ct. 2505, 57 L.Ed.2d 428 (1978) (holding that employees have the right to distribute union literature in nonwork areas of the employer's premises during nonworking periods and employ- ers may not interfere with this right except to the extent neces- sary to maintain production or discipline); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801–805, 65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945) (same). If the area is a mixed area, meaning that, while some people may use the area for work, most of the em- ployees use it for nonwork purposes—such as a lunch area or a break area—employer still may not prohibit the distribution of union literature. See Rockingham Sleepwear, Inc., 188 NLRB 698, 1971 WL 32368 (1971); Oak Apparel, Inc. v. Local 107, 218 NLRB 701, 1975 WL 5603 (1975); Transcon Lines v. Brown, 235 NLRB 1163, 1978 WL 7496 (1978), aff'd in relevant part, 599 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.1979), United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 228 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2000). The undisputed evidence of record establishes that the mate- rials were discarded and removed because of a complete union material prohibition/directive issued by the district manager Pringle and carried out by the subordinate store manager Hub- bard.1 The b l a n k e t prohibition and removal of any union ma- terials on the store premises at any time is presumptively invalid and unlawful. See Starbucks Corp., 372 NLRB No. 93 (2023). I find that the blanket prohibition communicated to employees and the discarding of union materials would reasonably tend to inter- fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. See Multi-Ad Services, 331 NLRB1226, 1227– 1228 (2000) (emphasis in original), enfd. 255 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2001). Respondent’s speculative assertions that it was privileged to remove the items as a “housekeeping” function, because of the passage of time or that the items were removed because of the location of the items are simply not persuasive given that the clearly articulated reason for the removal was not because of any housekeeping or time related issues and/or location of the post- ings but rather because union materials were completely prohib- ited on the premises and could only be distributed in the parking lot. Also, contrary to Respondent’s contentions, the evidence established that nonwork-related items were allowed to be posted in the back-office area where the flyers had been posted including, photos, postcards, sticky notes, and photos from cus- tomers which were not similarly discarded. (Tr. 30.) It is well established that “once an employer permits employees to post hearing was still employed in the position of district manager and was not called as a witness in the proceedings to dispute the allegations. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6 some notices that are not related to work, then the employer may not validly discriminate against union related material. See Ar- kansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 257 NLRB 420 (1981), enfd. sub nom. ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 673 F.2d 228 (8th Cir.1982), NLRB v. Honeywell, Inc., 722 F.2d 405, 406 (8th Cir. 1983). I therefore find that the discarding of the union materials, along with the communications to employees that they were pro- hibited from having or distributing union materials violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent, Starbucks Corporation, has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Charging Party, Workers United Labor Union Interna- tional, affiliated with Service Employees International Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent committed unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by: Discarding union materials and communicating to employees that they could not have or distribute union material on the Eastlake store premises. 4. The unfair labor practices found affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli- cies of the Act. I will order that the employer post a notice at the facility in the usual manner, including electronically to the extent mandated in J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11, 15–16 (2010). On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended2 ORDER Respondent, Starbucks, Corporation, Seattle, Washington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Or- der shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. If the facility is open and staffed by a substantial complement of em- ployees, the notices must be posted within 14 days after service by the Region. If the facility is closed due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19) pandemic, the notices must be posted within 14 days after the facility reopens and a substantial complement of employees have re- turned to work, and the notices may not be posted until a substantial com- plement of employees have returned to work. Any delay in the physical posting of paper notices also applies to the electronic distribution of the notice if Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by electronic means. Danbury Ambulance Service, Inc., 369 NLRB No. 68, slip op. 4 (2020). If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the 1. Cease and desist from (a) Unlawfully discarding union materials and communi- cating to employees that they were completely prohibited from having or distributing union material on the Eastlake store prem- ises. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectu- ate the policies of the Act. (a) Post at its Seattle, Washington Eastlake store, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, after be- ing signed by Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employ- ees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If, during the pendency of these proceedings, Respondent has gone out of business or closed the store involved in these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since August 11, 2022. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Re- gional Director for Region 19 a sworn certification of a respon- sible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that Respondent has taken to comply. Dated, Washington, D.C. December 20, 2023 APPENDIX Notice to Employees Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” 3 If the facility is open and staffed by a substantial complement of employees, the notices must be posted within 14 days after service by the Region. If the facility is closed due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19) pandemic, the notices must be posted within 14 days after the facility reopens and a substantial complement of employees have re- turned to work, and the notices may not be posted until a substantial com- plement of employees have returned to work. Any delay in the physical posting of paper notices also applies to the electronic distribution of the notice if Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by electronic means. Danbury Ambulance Service, Inc., 369 NLRB No. 68, slip op. 4 (2020). If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” STARBUCKS CORP. 7 FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities. WE WILL NOT unlawfully discard union materials and com- municate to employees that they were completely prohibited from having or distributing union material at the Eastlake store premises. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re- strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above. STARBUCKS CORPORATION LLC The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/ 19-CA-301179 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.