Pub. L. 104-106, div. A, tit. XIV, sec. 1405
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING TREATY VIOLATIONS.
SEC. 1405. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING TREATY VIOLATIONS. (a) Reaffirmation of Prior Findings Concerning the Krasnoyarsk Radar.— Congress, noting its previous findings with respect to the large phased-array radar of the Soviet Union known as the “Krasnoyarsk radar” stated in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 902(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100–180; 101 Stat. 1135) (and reaffirmed in section 1006(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101–189; 103 Stat. 1543)), hereby reaffirms those findings as follows: (1) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each party from deploying ballistic missile early warning radars except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward. (2) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each party from deploying an ABM system to defend its national 110 STAT. 491territory and from providing a base for any such nationwide defense. (3) Large phased-array radars were recognized during negotiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as the critical long lead-time element of a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles. (4) In 1983 the United States discovered the construction, in the interior of the Soviet Union near the town of Krasnoyarsk, of a large phased-array radar that has subsequently been judged to be for ballistic missile early warning and tracking. (b) Further Reference to 1987 Congressional Statements.— Congress further notes that in section 902 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100–180; 101 Stat. 1135) Congress also— (1) noted that the President had certified that the Krasnoyarsk radar was an unequivocal violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and (2) stated it to be the sense of the Congress that the Soviet Union was in violation of its legal obligation under that treaty. (c) Further Reference to 1989 Congressional Statements.— Congress further notes that in section 1006(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101–189; 103 Stat. 1543) Congress also— (1) again noted that in 1987 the President declared that radar to be a clear violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and noted that on October 23, 1989, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union conceded that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and (2) stated it to be the sense of the Congress that the Soviet Union should dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar expeditiously and without conditions and that until such radar was completely dismantled it would remain a clear violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. (d) Additional Findings.— Congress also finds, with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar, that retired Soviet General Y.V. Votintsev, Director of the Soviet National Air Defense Forces from 1967 to 1985, has publicly stated— (1) that he was directed by the Chief of the Soviet General staff to locate the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk despite the recognition by Soviet authorities that the location of such a radar at that location would be a clear violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and (2) that Marshal D.F. Ustinov, Soviet Minister of Defense, threatened to relieve from duty any Soviet officer who continued to object to the construction of a large-phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk. (e) Sense of Congress Concerning Soviet Treaty Violations.— It is the sense of Congress that the government of the Soviet Union intentionally violated its legal obligations under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to advance its national security interests. (f) Sense of Congress Concerning Compliance by Russia With Arms Control Obligations.— In light of subsections (a) through (e), it is the sense of Congress that the United States should remain vigilant in ensuring compliance by Russia with its 110 STAT. 492arms control obligations and should, when pursuing future arms control agreements with Russia, bear in mind violations of arms control obligations by the Soviet Union.