Pub. L. 100-180, div. A, tit. I, pt. C, subpt. 2, sec. 233

REPORT ON HOW ABSENCE OF THE ABM TREATY WOULD AFFECT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE PROGRAMS

EnactedYear: 1987Length: 698 wordsOfficial source
SEC. 233. REPORT ON HOW ABSENCE OF THE ABM TREATY WOULD AFFECT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE PROGRAMS (a) Report on No ABM Treaty Limitations.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report concerning what the effect would be on strategic offensive and defensive programs of the United States if there were no limitations on strategic defensive systems in force under the 1972 ABM Treaty. (b) Matters To Be Included.—The report shall include the following: (1) An analysis of the ramifications of there being no limitation in force under the 1972 ABM Treaty on development under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program of strategic defenses, including comprehensive strategic defense systems and more limited defenses designed to protect vital military and command and control assets of the United States. (2) A comparison, based on the analysis made under paragraph (1), of the research and development programs that could be pursued under the SDI program under the limitations applicable under the restrictive interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, under the less restrictive interpretation of such treaty, and under a case in which there were no such limitations, including a comparative analysis of— (A) the overall cost of such research and development programs; (B) the schedule of such research and development programs; (C) the level of confidence attained in such research and development programs with respect to supporting a decision to commence full-scale engineering development under such programs in the early-to-mid 1990s. (3) A list of options for the SDI program, assuming that there are no limitations in force under the 1972 ABM Treaty, that meet one or more of the following objectives: (A) Reduction of overall development cost. (B) Advancement of the schedule for making a decision to commence full-scale engineering development. (C) Increase in the level of confidence in the results of the research by the original scheduled date for the commencement of full-scale development. 101 STAT. 1062 (4) An analysis of how rapidly, in the absence of limitations under the 1972 ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union could deploy a nationwide anti-ballistic missile defense of military and nonmilitary targets and the consequences of such a deployment. The analysis should include an assessment of the following: (A) The effect of such deployment on the confidence of the United States that, should deterrence that depends increasingly on defensive forces fail, the planned strategic nuclear forces of the United States would be sufficient to hold assets that the leaders of the Soviet Union value at risk following a first strike by the Soviet Union against the United States. (B) The changes that must be made to the strategic offensive forces of the United States to hold assets that the leaders of the Soviet Union value at risk in the presence of strategic defenses. The analysis should include both the cost of those changes and the time period scale over which they could be accomplished. (C) The consistency of the required changes to United States strategic offensive forces of the United States described under subparagraph (B) with the current United States negotiating position in the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) negotiations. (D) The degree to which crisis stability would be affected during the transition period between the appearance of nationwide anti-ballistic missile defenses by both the United States and the Soviet Union and the completion of the changes that the United States would make to its strategic offensive forces in response to such defenses by the Soviet Union. (5) An analysis of the effect on deterrence of nuclear conflict if both the United States and Soviet Union deploy strategic defenses of comparable capability, considering both less capable and highly capable strategic defenses, as well as appropriate transition issues (including the effect on deterrence of the potential vulnerability of strategic defenses). (c) Deadline for Report.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than March 1, 1988. (d) Report Classification.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified versions. (e) 1972 ABM Treaty Defined.—In this section, the term “1972 ABM Treaty” means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972.
Pub. L. 100-180, div. A, tit. I, pt. C, subpt. 2, sec. 233: REPORT ON HOW ABSENCE OF THE ABM TREATY WOULD AFFECT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE PROGRAMS | Justis AI