The Governor is entitled to three full 24-hour days for consideration of bills.

free from all rights on behalf of the state. In this opinion I con- cur. As to section 14, township 33 north, range 3 west, the records of the auditor of state's office show that this land was sold on the 10th day of December, 1904, pursuant to the act of 1899, found o- page 398 of the session laws of that year, to one Darrow, for the sum of $10,080, and a deed for said land was duly executed by the auditor of state to said purchaser. I am of the opinion that the recitals contained in Enrolled Act No. 273, Senate, are correct so far as they relate to any claim or title possessed by the state of Indiana to the land involved. BILLS-GOVERNOR ENTITLED TO THREE FULL DAYS h\ WHICH TO CONSIDER. March 5, 1907. Ion. J. Frank Hanly, Governor of Indiana: Dear Sir-You presented to me the question, Within what time after a bill is presented to you you are required to return the same under section 140 Burns' Statutes 1901.? The portion of this section which calls for construction reads as follows: "If any bill shall not be returned by the governor within three days, Sundays excepted, after it shall have been pre- sented to him, it shall be a law without his signature unless the general adjournment shall prevent its return, in which case it shall be a law unless the. governor within five days next after such adjournment shall file such bill with his ob- jections thereto in the office of the secretary of state, and shall lay the same before the general assembly at its next session in like manner as if it had been returned by the gov- ernor. But no bills shall be presented to the governor with- in two days next previous to the final adjournment of the general assembly." The rule which is supported by a great weight of authority i; that in computing the three days mentioned in the above section the day of presentation is to be excluded and the last day included. This construction affords the executive three full days after the day of presentation in which to consider the measure. See 26 Am. and Eng. Encyc. Law, page 551; Endlich on Interpretation of Stats., sec. 392; Price v. Whitman, 8 Cal. 412, 417; Iron Mountain Co. v. Haight, 39 Cal. 540; Computation of Time, 9 Colo. 632; Beaudean v. City, 71 Mo. 392, 397; State v. Secy. of State, 52 La. Ann. 936, 940, 941; Lankford v. Somerset Co., 11 L. R. A. 491 at 493. I have been unable to find any Indiana authorities directly in point, but in Benson v. Adams et al., 69 Ind. 353, the supreme court of Indiana, in an.action upon a promissory note, payable in bank, in discussing days of grace, after quoting section 787 of the code, uses this language: "The time within which an act is to be done as herein provided shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. It is also enacted that ou all bills of ex- change payable within this state, whether sight or time bills, three days of grace shall be allowed. Under these statutes it has been held that the day includes twenty-four hours. In computing the time on promissory notes, negotiable and pay- able at a bank in this state, the day upon which the note is made is excluded and the third day of grace included." Again in Backer v. Paine et al., 130 Ind. 288, see .294 for reason- ing, in discussing the right of redemption, the supreme court said: "It is contended, however, that the year for redemption expired on the 8th day of June, 1889, and that a redemption on the 9th day of that month would not have been sufficient. We think it clear that the statutory rule for the computa- tion of time governs the case, and under that rule the day of the sale must be excluded. Our decisions have applied the rule to all cases affecting matters of statutory procedure." Citing State ex rel. Thorne, 28 Ind. 306; Towell v. Holl- weg, 81 Ind. 154; English v. Dickey, 128 Ind. 174. Rule 21 of the supreme court of the state of Indiana reads: "The appellant shall have sixty days after submission in which to file his brief." It will be observed that this language is very similar to that of the clause of the constitution referred to, the only difference being that if the bill shall, not be returned within three days after it shall have been presented it shall be a law, while in the rule from which I have quoted the language is "sixty days after submission." Judge McCabe in Smith v. Wells _Mfg. Co., 144 Ind. 266, on page 271 of the opinion says: "The date of submission being September 23, 1895, we must exclude that day in the count and include the 23rd day of December, the statute requiring the first day to be ex- cluded and the last day to be included." Citing section 1304 Burns', which is the section of the statute relating to com- putation of time for service of process, notice, etc. Thus it will be seen from these authorities that this statute is extended to computation of time in all matters in Indiana. As early as Womack v. McAhren and wife, 9 Ind. 6, on page 7 of the opinion of the court uses this language: "Nor does the statutory rule of excluding the first day and including the last make any difference. That was the law long before the statute was enacted. Indeed the statute was but enacting the decisions of the supreme court." This authority on this question is cited with approval in Flynn v. Taylor et al., 145 Ind. 533, on page 535. With reference to what constitutes a day in Board et al. v. Board et al., 27 App. 406, in considering the pay of a court bailiff under section 6528b Burns, allowing said bailiff a per diem of $2, the supreme court holds that twenty-four hours constitutes a day. Again in Monroe, Auditor, v. State ex rel. Willard, 157 Ind. 45, on page 48 of the opinion Judge Dowling, in considering the ques- tion of the amount of fees due jurors, uses this language: "When the statute says that the fees of jurors shall be two dollars a day while in actual attendance it contemplates a calendar day of twenty-four hours." It is my opinion that in counting time you are entitled to three full days of twenty-four hours each, excluding the day of presenta- tion, for the consideration of bills. The courts are universal in this holding, except in one state, New Hampshire, and that was an early case, which was adhered to on the ground that it had become a custom of computation'in that state.