Regarding the salary of a circuit judge pro tem.

JUDGES-SALARIES OF CIRCUIT JUDGE PRO TEAM., UN- DER ACT OF 1907. April 23, 1907. Hon. John C. Billheimer, Audior of State, Indianapolis, Indiana: Dear Si--I am in receipt of your favor of the 19th inst., stating the following facts: Hiram S. Biggs was elected circuit judge for a term expiring November 17, 1908. He assumed office November 17, 1902, and in 1904 was declared of unsound mind and placed under guardian- ship. One L. W. Royse was appointed by the governor as judge pro tempore. The statute under which this appointment was made provided that the compensation of such judge pro tem. should be at the rate of $1,900 per annum for the time he served, which sum should be deducted from the salary of the regular judge. (Acts 1871, p. 54; Burns' Stats. 1901, Sec. 1393). Under these facts and in view of the recently enacted statute fixing the salaries of all circuit judges at $3,500 (Acts 1907, p. 182), you ask what portion of the $3,500 per annum is payable to Royse, the judge pro tem., and what amount the regularly elected judge should receive. The statute allowing a judge pro tempore to draw a salary at the rate of $1,900 per year was enacted in 1871 (Acts 1871, p. 54). At that time the salary of circuit judges was $2,000 per annum (Acts 1865, p. 130). It was not until 1873 that the regu- lar salary was increased to $2,500 (Acts 1873, p. 190). Since the act of 1871 expressly required that the salary of the temporary judge should be deducted from that of the regular incumbent, it is clear that the purpose of the legislature, in enacting the law of 1871, was to give to the appointee, compensation at the rate of $1,900 per year, and the regular judge a compensation at the rate of $100 per year; in other words if the judge pro tem. served a full year, he received nineteen-twentieths of the entire salary and the regularly elected judge received one-twentieth. When the act of 1907 was passed, it must be assumed the legis- lature did not intend to produce absurd or unreasonable conse- quences. To say that the entire increase of salary provided for in that act was for the benefit both of judges who were giving their entire time to the labors of their office and who were ren- dering valuable and intelligent service to the public, and also was for the benefit of judges who were rendering no service what- ever, and, so far as their public functions were concerned, were useless to the community, would be imputing absurd designs to the general assembly. That body did not intend to place a com- petent officer on the same plane with one wholly disqualified to act. A desire to render adequate compensation for services actu- ally performed and not charity or sentiment, was the controlling motive back of this statute. Neither can it be said that the judge pro tempore is to receive but $1,900, while the incompetent judge is to have his salary increased to $1,600. It would be astounding for the legislature to pay a disqualified officer an increasing salary for doing nothing, as it would be to raise the salary of a dead man. The act of 1871 does not declare the salary of the appointee shall be $1,900. It provides that his compensation shall be at the rate of $1,900 per annum. The rate, as above stated, is virtually fixed by that act as nineteen-twentieths; hence, when the aggre- gate salary was increased, the proportions in which it was divis- ible, remained constant. It follows that under the present statute, nothing to the 'contrary being indicated therein, the temporary appointee is entitled to $3,325 out of the annual salary of $3,500 and the regular judge to $175. STATISTICIAN-CAN NOT COMPEL COUNTY RECORDER TO FURNISH STATEMENT OF REAL ESTATE TRANS- FERS, ETC. April 24, 1907. Miss Mary Stubbs, State Statistician, Indianapolis, Indiana: Dear Madam-In answer to your inquiry as to whether you can compel county recorders to furnish you with a statement of the real estate transfers for .the month of February, 1907, includ- ing the consideration paid in each instance in their respective counties, I beg leave to advise that your duties are defined by statute, and there does not appear to be any statutory duty re- quiring information of that character, and there is nothing upon which you are required to report officially which would call for such an inquiry. Such county officers defaulting in answering any inquiry within the scope of your duties are liable to statu- tory penalty, and in each statute providing the penalties the liabil- ity is limited to default in answering inquiries with reference to matters about which inquiries from you are within the scope of your duties,