No. 12 (1972)
Number 12 November 19, 1971
Cite as Mass. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12, Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12 (1972)
Number 12
November 19, 1971
Mrs. Nancy B. Beecher, Chairman
Civil Service Commission
State House
Boston, Massachusetts 02133
Dear Mrs. Beecher:
You have requested my opinion on the following question:
Where an
applicant
for a
civil
service position has
pro-
tested the contents of a civil service examination for that pos-
ition to the Director of the Division of Civil Service, and the
Director has denied
that
protest,
does
the
Civil
Service
Commission have sufficient statutory authority to reverse the
Director's decision that the examination
is valid and that
its
results should stand? Specifically, does the Commission have
the authority to determine whether the Director has met the
requirements of section 10 of Chapter 31 of the General Laws
which provides,
in
part,
that "... they
[the examinations]
shall relate to matters which will fairly test the fitness of the
applicants actually to perform the duties of the positions for
which they apply."
It
is, of course, fundamental that statutes are to be construed accord-
ing to the intention of the Legislature:
"[SJtatutes are to be construed
according to the intention of the framers ..." Howard v. Harris, 90
Mass. 297, 298. With respect to the
civil service law, the fundamental
rule of construction
is as follows: "The civil service law as a whole
.
.
.
'ought,
if possible, to be so construed as to make
it an effectual piece of
legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason.'
' Younie
v. Doyle, 306 Mass. 567, 571-572.
General Laws,
c.
13,
§ 2 creates the Division of Civil Service within
the Department of Civil Service and Registration and provides that the
P.D.
12
69
Division of Civil Service "
.
.
. shall be under the supervision and con-
trol of a director of civil service, who shall be the executive and adminis-
trative head of the division ..." This section emphasizes the "adminis-
trative" nature of the Director's position by adding, "He shall be a per-
son
familiar with
the
principles and experienced
in the methods and
practices of personnel administration."
General Laws, c. 31, § 2 details some of the duties and powers of the
Civil Service Commission, among which
is the following: "Hear and
decide all appeals from any decision or action of, or failure to act by, the
director ..." (Emphasis supplied.) The choice and use of the modifiers
"all" and "any" suggests that the Legislature intended this appellate au-
thority to be both broad and eclectic in nature, and to be limited,
if at
all, only by reservations or qualifications expressly spelled out within
the statute
itself. Section 2 clearly provides for appellate review by the
Commission of a Director's decision regarding examination results: "An
appeal from a decision determining the results of an examination shall be
in writing in the form approved by the commission, and shall contain a
brief statement of the facts upon which such appeal
is based ..."
However, on this particular grant of appellate review to the Commission
by the Legislature, there
is one explicit qualification: "[PJrovided, that
no decision of the director relating to an examination mark shall be re-
versed and no such mark changed unless the commission finds that
it
was through error, fraud, mistake or in bad faith ..." (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
It
is important
to note
that
this
single
limitation on the
Commission's otherwise full and unfettered appellate authority over the
Director's
decisions
refers
expressly and exclusively
to examination
marks alone (as opposed to a broader, more encompassing term such as
examination "results" or examination "content" or "format"). That the
Legislature so intended this one limitation to apply specifically and ex-
clusively to the review of "marks" (and not to the review of examina-
tion "results") is plainly evidenced by the fact that the 1945 amendment
to this section inserted the restrictive phrase "relating to an examination
mark."
St.
1945,
c. 725, §
1. Prior to 1945, this proviso which required
the Commission to find that the Director's decision was "... through
error, fraud, mistake or in bad faith ..." before the Commission could
reverse the Director's decision applied to any and all appeals concerning
the results of an examination. Thus,
I conclude that where a decision of
the Director regarding the results of an examination
is being reviewed
by the Commission, the Commission does have statutory authority to
reverse, upon appellate review,
the
Director's
decision
that an
examination's results should stand.
I now reach the specific example referred to in your question. General
Laws, c. 31, § 10 speaks directly to the scope of examinations offered by
the Division of Civil Service.
It reads,
in part, as follows: "Examina-
tions
shall be conducted under the direction of the director, who shall
determine the form, method and subject matter thereof; provided,
that
they [the examinations] [shall relate to matters which will fairly test the
70
P.D.
12
fitness of the applicants actually to perform the duties of the positions
for which they apply." (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear from the language
in this section that the authority granted to the Director
is not unqual-
ified or final. On the contrary, the qualifying proviso is in the nature of a
caveat to the Director, reminding him that his decisions concerning the
scope of examinations are subject to a standard of "fairness" and, to the
degree that those decisions do not conform to that standard of fairness,
are reviewable by, and subject to reversal by, the Commission. Such a
legislative intent is both inferable from and consistent with the appellate
authority broadly and absolutely granted to the commission in § 2 of c.
31 cited supra.]
This conclusion
is supported by an analysis of two decisions of the
Supreme Judicial Court which dealt with the Commission's powers over
the results of examinations. In Moore v. Civil Service Commission, 333
Mass. 430, the petitioner, along with seven others, took a competitive
civil service promotional examination. He was notified that
his grade
was the highest received by anyone taking the examination. After the
grades had been recorded, some of the other competitors appealed to the
Director of Civil Service who, after hearing, denied their appeal and re-
fused to set aside the results of the examination. From this decision, the
aggrieved competitors appealed to the Commission which voted to can-
cel the examination and to hold another. The Court stated:
"One of the subjects with which the special commissions
and the Legislature were especially concerned was that relat-
ing to examinations.
It is apparent from the recommendations
of the commissions and the statutes set forth above that the
making up and grading of examinations were to be primarily
administrative functions to be performed by the director and
that the appellate jurisdiction of the commission
relating to
examination marks was to be more restricted than
it was
in
other matters." 333 Mass. at 434.
However,
the Court drew a distinction between aggrieved applicants
who were challenging the examination
in
its
entirety and those
appli-
cants who were exercising their rights under G.
L.
c.
31,
§ 12A for a
review by the Commission of the markings of the examination. The
Court noted that,
"If the former [challenging the examination in its entirety],
we cannot say that the commission could not,
in appropriate
cases, set aside an examination. In such cases, however, the
commission must set forth
in
its records the specific reasons
for
its action.
If the appeal here was of that sort we cannot
say on the basis of the petition that the commission exceeded
its authority. The commission may have had good grounds
for setting aside the examination." 333 Mass. at 436.
As an example of the type of case which the Court felt would justify
the Commission's
decision
to
set aside an examination where
it was
being challenged in
its entirety,
it said:
P.D.
12
71
"If, for example, the commission was satisfied that prior to
an examination the examination paper had been stolen or that
its contents had been revealed by a disloyal employee in the
division,
it would plainly be justified in setting the examina-
tion aside." 333 Mass. at 436, fn.
2.
The Court did remind the Commission, though, that:
"This limitation on the powers of the commission touching
examination marks could not be evaded by the simple device
of setting the examination
aside. Where
that course
is
adopted by the commission in cases of appeals from decisions
relating
to examination marks there must be
a finding of
error, fraud, mistake or bad faith." 333 Mass. at 436-437.
Thus, a key question seems to be whether or not a particular examina-
tion is being challenged in its entirety or only for the limited purpose of
reviewing some or all of the markings of applicants taking that examina-
tion.
If the latter, then there must first be a finding by the Commission
that such markings were arrived at by the Director, "... through error,
fraud,
mistake or
in bad
faith ..." and absent such a finding,
the
Commission may not reverse any examination mark assigned by the Di-
rector.
If, however, the former is the case,
i.e., that a particular exam-
ination
is being challenged in
its entirety, then the Commission can, in
appropriate cases, set aside such an examination.
However, an appeal as to markings may,
in an appropriate case, be
treated as a challenge to the examination in
its entirety. In DiRado v.
Civil Service Commission, 352 Mass.
130, the petitioner and seventy-
one other applicants took a civil service examination for the position of
artist in the Department of Public Works. The examination was held at
different places and only nine applicants, including DiRado, passed the
examination. Some applicants had the advantage of using
certain
mechanical drawing aids which they had brought
to the examination,
whereas other applicants had not brought such aids with them because
the notice of the examination gave no indication that their use would be
permitted. There was testimony
to the
effect that the use of these
mechanical drawing aids resulted
in a time advantage for those
appli-
cants who used them. Four applicants, including petitioner, requested
the Director to review their markings on some of the particular ques-
tions in the examination. Thereafter, three of the four applicants, includ-
ing DiRado appealed from the Director's decision to the Commission
under § 12A and the Commission voted to cancel the examination and to
request the
Director
to hold a new examination
for the
position.
Petitioner sought to quash the decision of the Commission to cancel that
examination that he had passed, and he contended that the subject of his
appeal to the Commission was limited to the markings (as opposed to a
review of the examination
in
its
entirety). The Court,
in
its response,
construed the appellate authority of the Commission rather broadly.
It
stated, "We conclude,
therefore,
that although the
appeals,
in form,
may have requested that the markings on designated examination ques-
72
P.D.
12
tions be reviewed, their purpose, in fact and in substance, was to have
the Commission review the manner in which the examination had been
conducted." 352 Mass. at 133. The Court continued:
"The Commission was therefore correct
in deciding that
the evidence showed that the use of drawing aids was a factor
in the results of the examination, that the applicants at large
had not been given an equal opportunity to use them, and that
a new examination with uniform standards was the feasible
way to provide an equal opportunity. The decision in no way
usurped the powers given by statute to the Director. Rather,
it was a quasi-judicial determination made by the commission
acting
in a quasi-judicial capacity." 352 Mass.
at
134. (Em-
phasis supplied.)
In conclusion,
it is my opinion that the Commission has statutory au-
thority to reverse a Director's decision that an examination is valid and
that its results should stand where the Commission finds that the exam-
ination, as offered, did not fairly test the fitness of the applicants actu-
ally to perform the duties of the positions for which they applied.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT H. QUINN
Attorney General