No. 23-85
Opinion letter to The Honorable Edwin Dirck
Cite as Mo. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 23-85
WILLIAM L. WEBSTER
ATTORNEY GENERAL
\
..JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI 65102
February 14, 1985
(31~) 751-3321
DIRECT DIAL:
OPINION LETTER NO. 23-85
The Honorable Edwin Dirck
Senator, District 24
State Capitol Building, Room 221
Jefferson City, Missouri
65101
Dear Senator Dirck:
This letter is in response to your request for an opinion of
this office asking whether in view of the legislative
appropriation history of S.C.S.H.B. 1013, Eighty-Second General
Assembly, the Department of Social Services had authority to
utilize funds from C.C.S.H.B. lOll for the purpose of relocation
and movement of personnel from the Kansas City State Office
Building or for the purpose of renovation of the office building.
It is our understanding that the appropriations to which you
refer were in C.C.S.H.B. lOll, summarized in pertinent part as
follows:
Section 11.100.
To the Department of
Social Services, For the Division of
Family Services, for the purpose of
funding Administrative Services, Expense
and Equipment.
Section 11.105.
To the Department of
Social Services, For the Division of
Family Services, For the purpose of
funding Income Maintenance
Administration, Expense and Equipment.
Section 11.140.
To the Department of
Social Services, For the Division of
F£mily Services, For the purpose of
funding Children's Services
Administration, Expense and Equipment.
Section 11.171.
To the Department of
Social Services, For the Division of
Family Services, For the purpose of
funding Field Service Operations,
Expense and Equipment.
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The Honorable Edwin Dirck
Section 11.210.
To the Department of
Social Services, For the Division of
Family services, For the purpose of
funding Services for the Blind
Administration, expense and equipment.
-~ We believe that the threshold question is whether the
Executive Branch of state goverhment has the power to move
personnel from the Kansas City State Office Building, to rent
quarters from private interests and to renovate either the Kansas
City State Office Building premises or the rented premises to
make them suitable for present and future operations.
In this
respect we note that the Governor's Executive Order 84-10 dated
July 24, 1984, found an asbestos hazard to exist in the Kansas
City State Office Building and accordingly ordered the Office of
Administration to implement a temporary relocation plan for state
employees who work in that building, ordered that the directors
and employees of the state agencies having personnel located in
said building cooperate with the Office of Administration in the
implementation of the temporary relocation plan and that the
directors of such agencies provide adequate funding for that
portion of the temporary relocation plan which affects their
respective agency from existing F.Y. 1985 appropriations.
we are of the view that the Governor did in fact have the
substantive .authority to cause the agencies involved to move from
said state office building and to rent space to house such
agencies operations and to renovate such space to make it
suitable for such agencies operations.
The facts that we have at
this time are not clear as to the expenditures that may have been
made with respect to the renovation of the Kansas City State
Office Building.
your principal question asks whether the appropriations,
which we have quoted above, made in c.c.s.H.B. 1011, could be
expended for such moving,, rent and renovation.
In our view the
purpose of said appropriations, "expense and equipment", was
sufficient to cover such expenditures. You have inquired as to
whether the legislative determination in the history of the
appropriations measures would be sufficient to limit the purpose
of the appropriations as stated in c.c.s.H.B. 1011.
If the
appropriations language was doubtful or ambiguous, it would be
proper for a court to resort to the journals of the legislative
assembly to ascertain the intent of the legislature.
See Ex
Parte Helton 93 S.W. 913 (St. Louis App. 1906).
Further, under
Section 490.160 RSMo 1978 the printed journals of the Senate and
the House are prima fa·Cie evidence to the same extent that duly
authenticated copies of the originals would be •. Again, however,
legislative intent appears to be only relevant when there is a
statutory provision which is susceptible of several different
constructions.
Ex parte Helton at l.c. 915.
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Th€ Honorabl€ Edwin Dirck
It is clear that the Executive Branch of state government
does not generally have the authority to change the purpose of an
appropriation.
State ex. inf. Danforth v. Merrell, 530 s.w. 2d
209 (Mo. bane 1975).
However, where the-purpose of the
appropriation is sufficiently broad to cover the expenditures
made under the appropriation the rule of Merrell does not apply
since there is no change of purpose.
Implicit within the questions you ask is the question of
legislative control of expenditures by the appropriation process.
Article IV, Section 23, provides in pertinent part:
Every appropriation law shall distinctly
specify the amount and purpose of the
appropriation without reference to any other
law to fix the amount or purpose.
section 21.260 RSMo 1978 provides:
Appropriations for the operation and
maintenance of departments shall be
separately itemized; and separate
appropriations shall be made for each item of
extraordinary operation and maintenance
expenditure and for each major capital
expenditure.
Every appropriation law shall
distinctly specify the amount and purpose of
the appropriation without reference to any
other law to fix the amount of purpose.
Therefore it is clear that the legislature has a
constitutional mandate to state the purpose for which
appropriations are made.
See our Opinion No. 331-1974, copy
enclosed.
However, this office concluded in Opinion No. 212-
1974, copy enclosed, that, even assuming the legislature in a
particular appropriation act did intend to set certain personnel
positions and salaries, such would constitute general legislation
in an appropriation bill and would be prohibited by Article III,
Section 23, Missouri Constitution.
See also Opinion No. 189-
1974, copy enclosed.
We are also enclosing a copy of our Opinion No. 401-1971
which summarizes various instances in which this office expressed
the view that certain limitations in appropriation acts
constituted prohibited substantive legislation.
In the precise situation you present it seems.likely that
even an express and clear negative expression of legislative
direction in an appropriation measure which is otherwise
sufficient to permit such expenditures may be construed as
invalid substantive legislation.
From the prior opinions of this
office which we have enclosed it can further be concluded that a
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The Honorabl-e Eawi n Dirck
descent into minute detail could be construed as substantive
legislation and prohibited as such or, depending upon the
circumstances, may constitute a violation of the separation of
powers clause in Article II, Section 1, Missouri Constitution.
Clearly, however, the Constitution mandates that the
legislature distinctly specify the amount and purpose of the
appropriation without reference to any other law.
In this
respect we again refer you to our Opinion No. 331-1974, copy
enclosed, which found a limitation on expenditures based on the
language used in the appropriation act.
Enclosures:
Opinion No. 401-1971
Opinion No. 189-1974
Opinion No. 212-1974
Opinion No. 331-1974
Very truly yours,
j(J~.:W~
WILLIAM L. WEBSTER
Attorney General
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